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Expressivism and Constructivism1 
 
James Lenman 
 
This is my version of a paper published in J. Lenman and Y. Shemmer (eds.): 
Constructivism in Practical Philosophy (OUP, 2012). If citing or quoting please 
always refer to the published version.  
1.  
 
According to the tables of contents of two important recent American anthologies of 
papers there is an important position in contemporary metaethics that is called 
constructivismERWK6WHSKHQ'DUZDOO$OODQ*LEEDUGDQG3HWHU5DLOWRQ¶VFROOHFWLRQ
and Russ Shafer-/DQGDXDQG7HUHQFH&XQHR¶VGHYRWHHQWLUHVHFWLRQVWRLW:H%ULWV
DUHOHVVVXVFHSWLEOHFKHFNRXW$QGUHZ)LVKHUDQG6LPRQ.LUFKLQ¶VUHFHQWDQWKRORJ\
RU0LOOHU¶VIntroduction to Contemporary Metaethics DQG\RXZRQ¶WHYHQILQGLW
mentioned in the index.2 So are we Brits missing something? What is this 
constructivism? 
 
2.  
 
The story ± or the presently interesting bit ± EHJLQVZLWK5DZOV¶FODVVLFSDSHU
³.DQWLDQ&RQVWUXFWLYLVPLQ0RUDO7KHRU\´ILUVWSXEOLVKHGLQ7KHUH5DZOV
writes as follows: 
 
³To justify a Kantian conception within a democratic society is not merely to 
reason correctly from given premises, or even from publicly shared and 
mutually recognized premises. The real task is to discover and formulate the 
deeper bases of agreement which one hopes are embedded in common sense, or 
even to originate and fashion starting points for common understanding by 
expressing in a new form the convictions found in the historical tradition by 
connecting them with a wide range of people's considered convictions: those 
which stand up to critical reflection. « 
,VKRXOGHPSKDVL]HWKDWZKDW,KDYHFDOOHGWKH³UHDOWDVN´RIMXVWLI\LQJD
conception of justice is not primarily an epistemological problem. The search 
for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted in our conception of 
ourselves and in our relation to society replaces the search for moral truth 
interpreted as fixed by a prior and independent order of objects and relations, 
whether natural or divine, an order apart and distinct from how we conceive of 
ourselves. The task is to articulate a public conception of justice that all can live 
with who regard their person and their relation to society in a certain way. And 
though doing this may involve settling theoretical difficulties, the practical 
social task is primary. What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true 
to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper 
understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given 
                                                 
1
 I am grateful for help with this to all the participants in the Sheffield workshops and 
conference through the course of 2009 as well as to an audience at Cardiff in March 
2010. I am especially indebted to Yonatan Shemmer and Valerie Tiberius.  
2
 See Darwall, Gibbard and Railton 1997, Shafer-Landau and Cuneo 2007, Fisher and 
Kirchin 2006, Miller 2003.  
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our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most 
reasonable doctrine for us. We can find no better basic charter for our social 
world. Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood 
in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart 
from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral 
facts. Whether certain facts are to be recognized as reasons of right and justice, 
or how much they are to count, can be ascertained only from within the 
constructive procedure, that is, from the undertakings of rational agents of 
FRQVWUXFWLRQZKHQVXLWDEO\UHSUHVHQWHGDVIUHHDQGHTXDOPRUDOSHUVRQV´3 
 
I find in myself a considerable measure of agreement with what Rawls says here, so 
perhaps I might be some kind of constructivist. But it would still be nice to be clearer 
about what that is. This will take us some distance from Rawls but we will return to 
him in the end. 
 
3. 
 
Consider sets of norms. In order to be metaphysically as unassuming DVZHFDQOHW¶V
suppose that sets of norms are just sets of sentences in the imperative mood, so they 
are things of whose truth or falsity there can be no question. Though sets of norms are 
never true they are sometimes interesting. We could say that a set of norms is J-
interesting if it captures the requirements of justice in such a way that if and only if 
you act in accordance with it you will act justly. And we could say that a set of norms 
is M-interesting if it captures the requirements of morality in this way. And we could 
say that it is R-interesting if it captures the requirements of rationality in this way. 
And now there may be interesting theories to me proposed of the form: 
 
A set of norms is I-interesting iff it is N. 
 
ZKHUH³,-LQWHUHVWLQJ´LVDgeneral place-KROGHUZKHUHZHPLJKWVWLFN³--LQWHUHVWLQJ´RU
³0-LQWHUHVWLQJ´RU³5-LQWHUHVWLQJ´RUDQ\RIWKHRWKHUZD\VRIEHLQJLQWHUHVWLQJWKDW
we might, on a given occasion, be interested in. 
 
There are some quite familiar such theories. Thus many of you will have met: 
 
Nonnat: A set of norms is M-interesting iff the irreducible nonnatural moral facts say 
it is. 
 
Which is quite interesting. And many of you have also met: 
 
Util: A set of norms is M-interesting iff it leads us to maximally promote the welfare 
of all impartially considered. 
 
(Util is of course perfectly consistent with Nonnat. For someone might combine the 
metaethical claim that what moral rightness consists in is possessing the irreducible 
nonnatural property of moral rightness with the normative ethical claim that it is those 
actions that impartially promote welfare, and only those actions, that have this 
property. Equally someone who endorsed Util might mean thereby to express a form 
                                                 
3Rawls 1999, pp. 306-7 
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of reductive naturalism which simply identifies the property of rightness with that of 
impartially promoting welfare. The latter view of course would conflict with Nonnat.)  
 Here are a few more: 
 
ConstA: A set of norms is J-interesting iff it is congruent with our deeper 
understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our 
history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable 
doctrine for us. 
 
&RQVW$¶$VHWRIQRUPVLV--interesting iff it would be agreed to by rational agents in 
the original position. 
 
5DZOVDV,UHDGKLPEHOLHYHVERWK&RQVW$DQG&RQVW$¶EXWWDNHV$WREH
IXQGDPHQWDOLQWKDW$¶GHULYHVLWVZDUUDQWIURPWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI$ 
 
ConstB: A set of norms is M-interesting iff is it not possible for anyone to reasonably 
reject it as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement. 
 
ConstC: A set of norms is M-interesting iff it is possible for a rational agent to will it 
as a universal law. 
 
1RWHYHU\UHDGLQJRI&RQVW&LVQHFHVVDULO\FRQVWUXFWLYLVWEXW&KULVWLQH.RUVJDDUG¶V
is, as is RDZOV¶RZQ4) 
 
What might make these, at least under certain constructions, forms of constructivism?  
I think at least four things need emphasizing at the outset, though they are not 
all evident from the formulaic summaries just aired. The first is that it seems to be 
characteristic of constructivist versions of our general formula that we find normative 
concepts, rational, reasonable, etc, on the right hand side of the biconditional.5 So 
constructivism always contrasts with reductionist views such as the more 
metaethically ambitious reading of Util.   
The second feature that distinguishes constructivist views in normative 
philosophy is that N, the thing on the right hand side, is intended to specify some 
procedure we can in principle follow or some criterion we can in principle apply. It 
thus disallows any possibility that moral rightness might consist in something 
mysterious and epistemically inaccessible and remote to us. As Confucius is said to 
have rather sensibly proposed, If the Way were remote from humanity, it would not 
be the Way.6  
The third feature is that the order of determination7 is, for typical 
constructivists, intended to be read from right to left. N, the right hand side, is not 
intended to pick out some feature of interesting things of the appropriate sort that 
tracks their appropriate interestingness where the latter is conceived as constituted 
prior to and independently of the procedure or criterion picked out by N. 
A fourth distinctive feature of constuctivism is evident from the sentence with 
ZKLFK5DZOVIROORZVKLVVWDWHPHQWRI&RQVW$LQWKHORQJTXRWH,VWDUWHGZLWK³$QG
                                                 
4
 Korsgaard 1996, 2009, Rawls 2000. 
5
 Pace Ridge, this volume, section 1.  
6
 Chung-Yung (Doctrine of the Mean), 13 
7
 See Wright, 1992, appendix to chapter 3. 
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though doing this may involve settling theoretical difficulties, the practical social task 
LVSULPDU\´&RQVWUXFWLYLVPWDNHVWKHWDVNWRZKLFKPRUDODQGRURWKHUQRUPDWive 
inquiry is addressed to be fundamentally practical as opposed to theoretical. In fixing 
what principles of reason or morality to accept, we are trying to address some 
distinctively practical problem that we face. We are not, in anything at all like the way 
scientists are, trying to find stuff out. 
7KHWHUP³FRQVWUXFWLYLVP³LVDVOLSSHU\RQHZLWKFRQVLGHUDEOHYDULDWLRQLQ
how various moral philosophers characterize and understand it. But in the light of the 
foregoing, I think the following is roughly accurate in capturing what is shared by the 
main recent writers to represent themselves as some kind of constructivist and 
successfully delineates a more or less distinctive family of positions.  
 
Constructivist views understand correct normative views of the relevant kind 
(political, ethical, normative) as those which are the upshot of some procedure 
or criterion, where (a) that procedure or criterion is one followable or 
applicable by human beings where (b) that procedure or criterion is itself 
characterized in normative terms invoking ideals of e.g. rationality or 
reasonableness and (c) applying the procedure or criterion is taken as 
determining or constitutive of that correctness rather than as tracking a 
correctness conceived as prior and independent to it and (d) where the 
rationale for our taking an interest in whatever the procedure or criterion in 
question delivers is conceived of as speaking to distinctively practical as 
opposed to theoretical concerns.8 
 
4.  
 
A particularly interesting recent version of constructivism is articulated in 
6KDURQ6WUHHW¶VUHFHQWSDSHU³&RQVWUXFWLYLVP$ERXW5HDVRQV´ Street defends what 
she calls metaethical constructivism which she defines thus: 
 
According to metaethical constructivism, the fact that X is a reason to Y for 
agent A is constituted by the fact that the judgement that X is a reason to Y (for 
$ZLWKVWDQGVVFUXWLQ\IURPWKHVWDQGSRLQWRI$¶VRWKHUMXGJHPHQWVDERXW
reasons.9 
 
This looks open to an obvious worry. It certainly satisfies the constraint I 
placed on counting a view as constructivist that N, the procedure or criterion invoked 
in order to elucidate the normative concept that is our target for elucidation, should 
itself be a normative concept. But surely, it might be thought, the normative property 
on the left hand side had better not be the very same normative concept as we are 
                                                 
8
 Enoch 2009, p. 331 insists on the further specification that constructivist views must 
appeal to an ineliminable SURFHGXUH+HPHDQVE\WKLVWKDW³>W@KHQRUPDWLYHVWDWXVRI
the consequence here arguably depends on actually going through the procedure, not 
MXVWRQLWEHLQJWKHUHVXOWRIVRPHK\SRWKHWLFDOSURFHGXUH´%XWLWVHHPVUDWKHU
questionable to characterize a position in such a way that none of its best known 
defenders turn out to hold iWDQG(QRFK¶VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQVXUHO\KDVMXVWWKLV
consequence.  
9
 Street 2008, p. 223.  
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seeking an elucidation of. Otherwise surely our theory is circular and explains 
nothing.  
The worry can be tamed as Street makes plain. According to metaethical 
constructivism a certain class of judgments, we might say, are each, in isolation, 
answerable to a process of scrutiny in the light of the other judgements in the class. 
That is not necessarily a vicious circularity but seems rather defensible as a benign 
holism of the sort standardly taken on in preferring a coherentist to a more 
foundationalist account of normative epistemology. Normative inquiry, on this 
account, works much as Neurathian boat repair does. So thinks Street and so do many, 
including myself.  
 Really the idea is just the familiar idea of reflective equilibrium but with an 
HQKDQFHGDOOHJHGVLJQLILFDQFH$V6WUHHWZULWHV³,QPHWDHWKLFDOFRQVWUXFWLYLVP«WKH
fact that a normative judgement withstands scrutiny in reflective equilibrium is 
understood to be not only of epistemological significance but also of constitutive 
significance; in other words: this fact is understood to be not only an indication that 
the normative judgement is correct, but what it is IRUWKDWMXGJHPHQWWREHFRUUHFW´10  
 But now that we have beefed up the ambitions of reflective equilibrium, a new 
worry about circularity arises. If what we are trying to do is give an account of what it 
is to be a reason, does the invocation of judgements about reasons in our account itself 
simply show that we have failed to shed any noncircular light on this? For we already 
need to know what a reason is to know what judgements about reasons are. Just as we 
must already know what fish are in order to know what judgements about fish are. 
 Where fish are concerned, Street would, I am confident, agree with this. 
Where reasons are concerned she does not. Her theory she tells us is distinctive in the 
ZD\LW³UHGXFHVIDFWVDERXWUHDVRQVWRIDFWVDERXWZKDWZHMXGJHRUWDNHWREHUHDVRQV
with the latter understood in DZD\WKDWLVSULRUWRDQGLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHIRUPHU´
This, she says, retains the attractions of naturalism ± judging something to be a reason 
is after all just a mental state of a certain distinctive kind ± while avoiding an 
unappealing kind of naturalistic reductionism.11  
 At which point the reader is liable to think, Hullo, this sounds a bit familiar. 
For there are other people out there who seek to tame the mysteries of metaethics by 
first characterizing certain mental states of normative commitment or endorsement, 
the states, we might say, that normative utterances express, and then explaining what 
is conveyed by normative judgements in the light of this characterization. And these 
people too claim to have pulled off the attractive double act of avoiding an 
implausible naturalistic reductionism while avoiding metaphysical and 
epistemological mystification by saying nothing not consistent with a broadly 
naturalistic metaphysics. And these people are of course people like Simon 
Blackburn, Allan Gibbard and myself.12 These people are expressivists. Street is not. 
Rather she takes the distinctive character of normative judgement, of the state of mind 
of having something strike one as counting in favour of something to be primitive not 
open to further explanation.13  
 7KDWZRQ¶WVDWLVI\H[SUHVVLYLVWVZKRZLOOZDQWWRSUHVVWKHIROORZLQJ
question.14 &DQ¶W\RXDt least tell us whether this primitive state of mind is a belief, a 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., pp. 238-9. 
11
 For both the quoted passage and the point about reductionism, see ibid., p. 242.  
12
 Gibbard 1990, 2003; Blackburn 1998; Lenman 2007, 2010. 
13
 Street 2008, esp. pp. 239-242. 
14
 Cf. Ridge, this volume, who develops a similar point.  
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desire or something else? Does the judgement that something is a reason involve 
some distinctively cognitive orientation towards that thing? In which case we surely 
want a metaethical theory to tell us what we are believing about something when we 
EHOLHYHLWWREHDUHDVRQ$QGXQWLOLWGRHVZHVXUHO\KDYHQ¶WUHDOO\PDGHDQ\
metaethical progress at all.15  But if the state in question is fundamentally 
noncognitive in character then the dialectical pressure to give in and go expressivist 
seems irresistible. 
 Street see this problem and seeks to address it. Normative judgements, she 
says, clearly differ from both beliefs and desires. They clearly differ from beliefs in 
that they have a necessary connection to motivation that beliefs as such lack. So far so 
familiar. And they differ from desires because, she says, while the normative 
judgement that I have a reason to X constitutively involves judging that I have a 
reason to Y where Y is some necessary means to Xing, desires as such have no such 
constitutive involvement. There are two problems with the latter claim. First it is not 
so obviously correct. It might be argued, and has recently been energetically argued 
by Stephen Finlay, that desire does indeed constitutively involve desire to take the 
necessary means to its object.16 Secondly and less controversially, nobody ever said, 
normative judgements and desires were the same thing. The expressivist claim is that 
normative judgements are a distinctive subspecies of desire, broadly understood. And 
the very thing that makes that distinctive subspecies distinctive may well be some 
constitutive feature its members, as such, must have that is not shared by the wider 
species as a whole. 
 6WUHHW¶VYLHZ,VXJJHVWLVDWWUDFWLYHEXWXQVWDEOH,WLVKLJKO\QDWXUDOWRUHFDVW
it in expressivist terms. Doing so might yield something like the following: 
 
REASON: 7RWKLQNDFRQVLGHUDWLRQ&DUHDVRQLQIDYRXURIVRPHRQH¶Vĳ-ing is 
to favour that consideration guiding deliberation and action in furtherance of 
concerns, desires and aims to which it speaks in virtue of  it and they being 
able to withstand scrutiny in the light of other reasons.  
 
This is still an attractive view but it is no longer a view in competition with 
expressivism.  
 
5. 
 
Still further concerns for DYLHZVXFK6WUHHW¶VDUHDLUHGE\VRPHRWKHU
contributors to this volume. Thus Scanlon urges that the idea of reflective equilibrium 
could never itself be the basis of a constructivist account of reasons generally. The 
process of seeking reflective equilibrium about a subject matter cannot itself supply 
the basis for a constructivist account of that subject matter because the process of 
following the procedure specified in a constructivist account cannot itself require 
³UHSHDWHGMXGJHPHQWVDERXWWKHGRPDLQLQTXHVWLRQ´7KDWDMXGJHPHQWWRWKHHIIHFW
that something is a reason for me is among my judgements in reflective equilibrium 
means that the thing in question is indeed a reason for me only if the judgements I 
make along the way to that equilibrium are themselves sound. But that fact cannot, 
without circularity, furnish the basis for a constructivist account of what such 
soundness consists in. So while Scanlon thinks the method of reflective equilibrium is 
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 Finlay 2008.  
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our best method for ascertaining what reasons we have, he thinks it cannot furnish us 
with a constructivist account of what a reason is.17  
This is a SRZHUIXOREMHFWLRQ%XWVRPHWKLQJQRWXQOLNH6WUHHW¶VYLHZPLJKW
perhaps avoid its force. Consider: 
 
5('[LVUHGLII[¶VDSSHDULQJUHGVXUYLYHVWKHVFUXWLQ\RIVRPHDSSURSULDWH
normative discipline. 
 
This discipline might include appraising the stabilit\RI[¶VUHGDSSHDUDQFHE\
FKHFNLQJLWDJDLQVW[¶VHDUOLHUDQGODWHUDSSHDUDQFHVDSSUDLVLQJLWVFRPPRQDOLW\E\
FRPSDULQJQRWHVZLWKRWKHUVDERXWKRZ[DSSHDUVFKHFNLQJWKDW[¶VDSSHDUDQFHLVQRW
distorted by peculiarities or deficiencies in the lighting FRQGLWLRQVRULQWKHREVHUYHU¶V
YLVXDOIDFXOWLHVHWF+HUHZHPLJKWWKLQNRIWKLQJVOLNH[¶VDSSHDULQJUHGDVUDZLQSXW
states, not so much judgements as experiences distinguished by a particular 
phenomenal character. It is only through the application of disciplined scrutiny that 
WKH\VRPHKRZVROLGLI\LQWRMXGJHPHQWV7KHUHPLJKWEHDYHUVLRQRI6WUHHW¶V
FRQVWUXFWLYLVPWKDWVRXJKWWRHVFDSH6FDQORQ¶VREMHFWLRQE\VLPLODUO\WDNLQJ
normative judgements, qua inputs into reflective scrutiny, what Michael Ridge in his 
FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKLVYROXPHFDOOV³SULPLWLYHQRUPDWLYHMXGJHPHQWV´DVUDZIHHOLQJVRI
this sort. 
 %XWDV5LGJH¶VRZQGLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVSRVVLELOLW\PDNHVFOHDUWKLVLVQRWD
promising view. He makes a number of objections of which I here note two. First, I 
ZRXOGFRQFXUZLWKKLVREVHUYDWLRQWKDW³LWLVQRWDOOWKDWSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOO\SODXVLEOH
WKDWWKHUHLVDQ\³SXUH´IHHOLQJRIQRUPDWLYLW\´6HFRQGDV5LGJHDJDLQULJKWO\
REVHUYHV³LWLVKDUGWRVHHKRZWRDVPXFKDVPDNHVHQVHRIWKHLGHDWKDt dispositions 
WRKDYHVXFKIHHOLQJVPLJKWEHVHHQDVEHLQJVWUXFWXUHGLQWRD³ZHERIMXGJPHQWV´LQ
any sense.  That metaphor is apt only when we have something that looks much more 
like a genuine judgment which might bear conceptual and epistemic relations to other 
MXGJPHQWV´7KHQRUPDWLYHGLVFLSOLQHLVWRWDNHWKHIRUPRISUHVVXUHWRZDUGV
coherence, there will be no way for it to get to work at all on pure raw contentless 
experiences.18 
 Far more promising to conceive our normative judgements as desires, broadly 
understood. If we did this only for such judgements conceived as inputs, only for 
primitive normative judgements, we would end up, as Ridge notes, with a familiar 
form of subjectivism. But if we so regard all normative judgements, primitive or 
otherwise, we will get something like the form of expressivism articulated in 
REASON. Here the solidification into judgement imposed by normative discipline 
can be understood in terms of ways in which the applicability of norms of stability, of 
commonality, of coherence and consistency to what are, in the first analysis, passions 
in our souls, end up, if the quasi-realist project in metaethics can be made to succeed, 
intelligibly construed also, in the final analysis, as truth-apt judgements capable of at 
least some forms of objectivity.19  
A still further concern about circularity is raised by Ridge when he is 
discussing the possibility of understanding primitive normative judgements as sharing 
a direction of fit with belief. In which case, like myself above, he is keen to be told 
what content these are supposed to have. The content of a given such judgement, he 
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 Scanlon, this volume.  
18
 All quotations from Ridge, this volume.  
19
 See Gibbard 1990, part III.  
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observes, better not be just that it withstands scrutiny from the standpoint of other 
normative judgements or the account will be circular. Street herself has briefly aired 
the possibility that we might understand primitive normative judgements as referring 
to sui generis normative properties. This, she recognizes, would commit her to an 
error theory about primitive normative judgements20 and Ridge is surely right to judge 
that there would be little prospect of containing our scepticism to this level. If the raw 
materials are rotten so, inevitably, will be whatever we can make from them.21 Once 
again, an expressivist turn, taking the raw materials as desires, tames the problem 
nicely.  
 
6 
 
$PRQJFRQVWUXFWLYLVP¶VPRVWHQHUJHWLFFULWLFVDUH1DGHHP+XVVDLQDQG1LVKL
6KDKQRWDEO\LQWKHLUSDSHU³0LVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ0HWDHWKLFV´+HUH+XVVDLQDQG
Shah focus on the version of constructivism defended by Christine Korsgaard. Their 
principle objection to Korsgaard is that she seems to suppose her constructivism is a 
metaethical view offering a genuine alternative to such familiar metaethical positions 
DVQRQUHGXFWLYHUHDOLVPRUH[SUHVVLYLVP7KXVFRQVLGHU.RUVJDDUG¶V transcendental 
argument in Sources of Normativity that seeks to show us that we are rationally 
required to value our humanity.22 Here Hussain and Shah protest, justly I think, that 
WKLVGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\DGGXSWRDGLVWLQFWLYHSRVLWLRQLQPHWDHWKLFVXQWLOZH have been 
told what the devil this valuing is supposed to be. Is valuing my humanity a matter of 
believing something about it? If so, exactly what are we supposed to be believing 
when we value our humanity? Or it is some other kind of psychological orientation 
towards humanity, something perhaps like love? Whatever the answer, as long as it is 
missing, they deny that Korsgaard is in the business of metaethics at all.23  
 My own account as sketched here is not vulnerable to this charge. By 
marrying a form of constructivism to a form of expressivism I give an account that 
speaks to the semantic and metaphysical concerns of metaethics: on my expressivist 
account, normative judgements are taken to be a distinctive subspecies of desires. But 
that is not to say the constructivism bit is otiose and itself does no metaethical work. 
For the account of reason given by REASON helps us, I hope, to see part at least of 
what is distinctive about the distinctive subspecies. What does it tell us? 
 I think what it tells us is a bit complicated. REASON looks, to echo Street, 
like a highly formal, far from substantive, account of normativity. Which is sort of 
right. But REASON is a bit VXEVWDQWLYHDQGKHUH¶VZK\5($621WDNHVQRUPDWLYH
judgements as a species of desire that is constitutively responsible to some standard of 
coherence in the light of other normative judgements. And normative judgements like 
that plausibly must be governed by some sort of very weak norm of what we might 
call the unification of agency. I stress the sort of thing I mean by this is very modest, 
                                                 
20
 Street 2008, p. 241, note 55.  
21
 Ridge, this volume. Dorsey, this volume, develops a similar proposal while seeking 
to avoid error theory by divorcing semantic content from truth in normative contexts. 
But his view still finishes by taking normative truth to be a matter of coherence 
among judgements that speak of nothing real. Perhaps it might make sense to 
characterize normative truth in this way but it is puzzling why, so characterized, we 
should take much interest in it.  
22
 Korsgaard 1996.  
23
 Hussain and Shah 2006. see esp. p. 274.  
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not a philosophical hat from which I propose suddenly to pull the categorical 
LPSHUDWLYH,ZRXOGQHYHUGRWKDWWRP\IHOORZ+XPHDQV,W¶VVLPSO\DPDWWHURI
how Neurathian boat repair works. We fix this bit of the boat buoyed up by the bits 
we fixed yesterday and last week. And this is possible, at least at the normative end of 
the analogy, only if we have some trust in and accord some authority to those other 
bits. Without some degree of normative community between myself now and at 
earlier times, without a degree of diachronic normative stability between my 
deliberating reflective self now and at earlier times, I doubt that normative thinking, 
as opposed to a much simpler kind of practical thought ± Jimmy want fish, Jimmy 
grab fish ± would get off the ground at all.24 
 Normative thought is deeply concerned with such unification. The form of 
FRQVWUXFWLYLVP,¶PGHIHQGLQJWDNHVVHULRXVO\WKHLGHDWKDWZHVKRXOGVHHQRUPDWLYH
questions as addressed to distinctively practical as opposed to theoretical problems. 
The fundamental practical problem to which normative thought is addressed is that of 
conflict. I have many many desires and often they pull me in conflicting directions. 
The way I, like all human beings, solve this problem, is by reflection, by reflecting 
critically on my desires and seeking to distil from the chaos of brute first order desires 
a far less chaotic body of desires I reflectively endorse and so stand ready 
wholeheartedly to promote to the status of intentions or plans. The idea is that this 
body of reflectively sanctioned desires can, if I do my normative thinking right, be 
made to cohere, as the chaotic mass of raw wants from which it emerges does not 
FRKHUH7KDWLVZK\*DU\:DWVRQ¶VIDPRXVTXHVWion ± :KDW¶VVRVSHFLDODERXW
second order desires? ± is not in fact so hard to answer. 25)26 
 In order then to be in the game of normative thought at all, I need to be in the 
business of seeking to unify my agency. And as well as unification playing some such 
de jure role in my thought, my playing the game at all also requires at least a minimal 
level of de facto unification, in particular, as I just urged, some minimal degree of 
diachronic stability of normative response and judgement. But here I stress again all 
this is very minimal. The unity of agency required to count as a maker of normative 
judgements at all is fantastically modest. So modest that, to all practical intents and 
purposes, it is highly appropriate to think of REASON, following Street as a formal 
rather than substantive constructivist account of reasons. So we are a long way from 
Rawls ± with whom we began - and a long way from Scanlon. A long way from those 
philosophers rich and impressive accounts of the workings of moral or political 
justification.  
 
7. 
 
 But not such a long way. Take a look at this: 
 
MORALITY: To call a consideration C a moral reason in favour of VRPHRQH¶V
ĳ-ing is to favour that consideration guiding our deliberation and action in 
furtherance of concerns, desires and aims to which it speaks in virtue of the 
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 Cf. Gibbard 1990, chapter 9. See also Lenman 2011.  
25See Watson 1975. And cf. Bratman 2004.  
26
 This paragraph recapitulates thoughts aired in Lenman 2007, section III. Cf, 
Lenman 2009. 
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fact that we might all, insofar as we are reasonable, agree in endorsing it and 
them as able to withstand scrutiny in the light of our other reasons.27  
 
Here my reasons have become our reasons. I like REASON as a theory of reasons and 
I rather like MORALITY as a theory of moral reasons. MORALITY embodies, 
among other things, a particular view of moral epistemology that regards moral 
inquiry as the pursuit of the kinds of normative commonalities needed to make life 
together as a well-functioning moral community possible for us, a view that puts what 
we can justify to others at central stage.  
 It is sometimes asked to what is moral theorizing responsible in the way 
scientific theorizing is to empirical observation. The question is hard and the standard 
answer, intuition, is of course notorious in its feebleness unless we can find a lot more 
to say. I like this rather different answer. My moral theorizing is responsible to, well, 
to you, provided only you are willing to engage with me in reasonable ways. And 
likewise to everyone else with whom I share a social world and seek to live in some 
kind of normative community, including my own later selves. Intuitions are important 
KHUHDOOULJKWEXWWKH\¶UHQRWEHVWXQGHUVWRRGDVEeliefs about some independent order 
of moral facts. Rather they are a sort of desires. I have a strong intuition that torture is 
wrong. I really do, but the best way of understanding what that means is just that I am 
deeply unwilling to accept as a set of moral norms governing the society where I live 
any such set that permits torture.28 If you want to live in moral community with me, 
you have to deal with that fact. It sits there on the table of our codeliberations and 
there it stays till you are able to persuade me to remove it. This pursuit of normative 
agreement takes many forms, from the relatively rough and tumble, messy business 
we call politics to the, at least in aspiration, more careful and rigorous business that 
we call moral philosophy,W¶VDGLIficult business and one that can go badly wrong. 
:KHQLWJRHVEDGO\ZURQJZHVKRXOGQ¶WVHHWKDWDVDFDVHRIIDLOLQJWRILQGVRPHWKLQJ
out we needed to discover but as a distinctively political catastrophe where our urgent 
aim of arriving at a shared set of moral understandings we are all willing to live with 
has failed.29 
Contrast this picture of moral epistemology with a more robustly realist 
alternative, naturalist or otherwise, according to which the relevant enterprise is 
simply one of finding stuff out. On that rival Platonist view, moral epistemology is, 
much as you might expect, a distinctive part of metaethics. But on my account, that 
LVQ¶WVR On my account, moral epistemology is, to a great extent, not part of 
metaethics at all. Thus when I say my moral theorizing is responsible to you and to 
others, I am not engaged in metaethics but simply moralizing though I believe I am 
moralizing well. On this account, moral epistemology turns out to be, iQ0DFNLH¶V
terms30, an almost wholly first-order enterprise, one about which, at the level of 
second-order metaethical theorizing, there is really precious little to say.  
That is very much in the spirit of the expressivist project. Back in the 1980s, 
Blackburn, famously, took on one of the great challenges for an expressivist 
metaethics, the challenge of explaining how, on an expressivist account, morality 
could be mind-independent, and tamed it by effectively taking it away from 
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  :KRLVLQFOXGHGLQ³ZH´KHUHLVRIFRXUVHDODUJHTXHVWLRQEXW,GRQRWDGGUHVVLW
here.  
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 Cf. Lenman 2007.  
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 Cf. Lenman 2010, section, 2. 
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 Mackie 1977, p. 16.  
 11 
metaethics altogether. The mind-independence of moral value, he urged, is a matter of 
regular first order normative ethical theory. A virtuous normative sensibility is one 
that takes the answers to normative questions as responsible to facts that are, at least 
usually and for the most part, not facts about that sensibility itself. If I thought the 
wrongness of torture depended on me and could be undercut simply by my changing 
my mind about it, that would be a disastrously bad way for me to think about 
torture.31 
 Another challenge for expressivism is to tell a credible story about moral 
epistemology. I think the kind of first-order moral constructivism articulated by Rawls 
and others suggests a beautifully credible way to answer to this question. But that 
answer is part of normative ethics and is moralized through and through. So the 
appearance of normative concepts on the right hand side of MORALITY is no 
objection to it. Nor is moral constructivism the only available answer. Instead of 
joining with you in the search for moral understandings we can all accept, I might 
propose that others simply defer to my superior wisdom, offering, if need be, to 
secure your deference by coercive means. There are extraordinarily good moral 
reasons to reject that understanding in favour of its constructivist alterative but 
expressivism as a metaethical theory says nothing against it. The reasons in question 
are substantive moral reasons, not part of metaethics. At a strictly positive level, as 
opposed to the business of criticizing rival accounts, the right story for an expressivist 
metaethics, as such, to tell about moral epistemology is: no story at all.  
   
 Constructivism, if MORALITY is a form of constructivism. is a story about 
how moral justification LVSRVVLEOHZLWKRXWUHIHUHQFHWRZKDW5DZOVFDOOV³the search 
for moral truth interpreted as fixed by a prior and independent order of objects and 
relations, whether natural or divine, an order apart and distinct from how we conceive 
RIRXUVHOYHV´$VVXFKLWFRKHUHVEHDXWLIXOO\ZLWKWKHDQWL-realist moral metaphysics 
we expressivists like. It offers us a credible and attractive story to tell about how 
PRUDOHSLVWHPRORJ\PLJKWZRUN7KLVVWRU\OLNH%ODFNEXUQ¶VVWRU\RIPLQG-
independence, is itself no part of metaethics even though, again like that other story, it 
addresses a challenge that arises within metaethics. So expressivists need 
constructivism. Expressivism, in turn, offers answers to questions about how the 
actions and utterances in which we make and express judgements about reason and 
values make good philosophical sense, questions which, as Hussain and Shah have 
urged and as we saw ourselves discussing Street, constructivism, as such, offers little 
help. So constructivists need expressivism.32  
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